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ABSTRACT
Payment card fraud causes multibillion dollar losses for banks and
merchants worldwide, often fueling complex criminal activities.
To address this, many real-time fraud detection systems use tree-
based models, demanding complex feature engineering systems to
efficiently enrich transactions with historical data while complying
with millisecond-level latencies. In this work, we do not require
those expensive features by using recurrent neural networks and
treating payments as an interleaved sequence, where the history of
each card is an unbounded, irregular sub-sequence. We present a
complete RNN framework to detect fraud in real-time, proposing
an efficient ML pipeline from preprocessing to deployment. We
show that these feature-free, multi-sequence RNNs outperform
state-of-the-art models saving millions of dollars in fraud detection
and using fewer computational resources.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Computingmethodologies→Neural networks; •Computer
systems organization→ Real-time system specification.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In payment card fraud, criminals execute physical or electronic pay-
ments without the cardholder’s authorization. Banks andmerchants
are liable for accepting such transactions and have to reimburse
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cardholders. Credit card fraud alone was responsible for $28B in
losses in 2018 [14].
Modern fraud detection systems combine rule-based systems
with machine learning classification models to score transactions.
Frequently used models are tree-based learners, such as Random
Forests [4], XGBoost [6], or LightGBM [16]. Tree-based learners rely
heavily on data augmentation in the form of feature engineering
to capture the usage patterns (or profiles) of cardholders [3, 25].
Profiles pose many challenges since they need to be refined during
model development, and efficiently handled in production.
Deep Learning (DL) can produce state-of-the-art results in many
areas without extensive feature engineering [17]. Recurrent Neural
Networks (RNNs) such as Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) [13]
and Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) [7] are DL architectures addressing
sequences and particularly suited for time-series data. However,
unlike in other domains, RNNs cannot be directly applied to fraud
detection in production because the payment sequence is composed
of multiple, interleaved, unbounded sequences, thereby requiring
careful management of the internal RNN state.
In this paper, we use GRUs to build fraud detection models with-
out intermediate feature engineering, suitable for mission-critical,
streaming systems with millisecond latency requirements.
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Figure 1: (top) Interleaved transaction history of three cards.
(bottom)At run-time, the system joins transaction 6with the
previous Card B GRU state (last changed in transaction 3).
Previously, it processed transaction 5 and stored the Card A
GRU state in an embedded DB and memory cache.
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We designed a system that is efficient during offline training and
during online, streaming classification. Our main contributions are:
(1) We identify a new type of problem: a sequence composed of
many interleaved, unbounded sub-sequences - i.e., the history
of each card - with irregular time intervals between events -
i.e., transactions (section 3.2).
(2) We propose an efficient batch training technique, sorting
per sub-sequence and time, processing scorable and non-
scorable events, limiting history, and chunking data to keep
GPUs maximally occupied (sections 3.3-3.5).
(3) We introduce an efficient streaming inference technique,
saving and restoring the GRU state, caching, and expiring
events (section 3.6).
(4) We evaluate the solution in two real-life use cases and show
that these multi-sequence RNNs outperform state-of-the-art
models in recall, but also latency, saving millions of dollars
in fraud detection and resources (section 4).
Figure 1 depicts the workings and architecture of our system in a
production scenario.
2 BACKGROUND
Commonly used statistical models for payment card fraud detection
include unsupervised and supervised methods [1, 5]. Whereas most
systems employ supervised techniques, deciding among the two
depends on business restrictions, mainly on whether historical
labels exist or not. This paper assumes the availability of labels and,
thus, uses supervised classification.
Without profiles, traditional tree-based models can only ana-
lyze the current transaction to inform predictions, ignoring the
users’ historical behavior. Profiles, in the context of this paper, are
arithmetic aggregations of the data by a particular field and over a
specified time window such as counts (e.g., number of transactions
per card in the last 24 hours), sums (e.g., total amount spent per
card in the last hour), ratios (e.g., average value of purchases for a
merchant in the last week), or count distinct (e.g., number of unique
cards used per terminal in the last hour). Building and managing
profiles is far from trivial:
• Training with profiles. Building good profiles is work, time,
and computation intensive, as, typically, there are many pos-
sible sensible aggregations. Therefore, model development
with profiles is expensive, as it requires data scientists to
generate new datasets, and evaluate many resulting mod-
els. This process slows down model development time and
requires specialized domain knowledge.
• Prediction with profiles. The use of profiles implies their real-
time availability at prediction time. As a result, they need
to be computed or retrieved for incoming transactions be-
fore making predictions. Fraud detection systems, however,
have to respect stringent latency SLAs in production, hence,
managing profiles can become an engineering bottleneck.
Deep Learning (DL) has proved successful for unstructured data
[17], including speech recognition or object detection, and, less
frequently, structured data [9]. LeCun et al. [17] described DL as
representation learning, as it receives the raw data and learns suitable
representations, providing an alternative to feature engineering and
profiles. Feedforward Networks (FNNs) are among the fundamental
types of DL in [22]. Guo and Li [12] use separate FNNs, one per
feature group, to detect credit card fraud. Similar transactions are
grouped and classified by an FNN trained on other similar transac-
tions. FNNs, however, are acyclic [22] and, hence, unable to capture
historic patterns and, ultimately, replace profiles.
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) are cyclic DL architectures
based on [21], addressing arbitrary sequences of input patterns [22].
RNN architectures include Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) [13]
and Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) [7]. Their cyclic nature allows
RNNs to encode patterns on sequences of events, i.e., learning se-
quence features, and provides an intriguing alternative to profiles.
Ando et al. [2] use LSTMs to detect fraudulent behavior in we-
blog data. They fit the model on an extensive sequence of events,
ordered chronologically. However, our problem is, in fact, a sequence
of sub-sequences per card. Li et al. [18] treat transaction fraud as sub-
sequences of events by account. The authors separate the accounts
into sets according to transaction counts and train an independent
GRU for each set. A limitation of this approach is that, in a produc-
tion scenario, sequences are unbounded and, therefore, we cannot
statically assign accounts to sets. Particularly, it is unclear what
would happen to the hidden states when an account changes sets. In
addition, whereas in our proposed solution, the prediction depends
only on the most recent recurrent state, the authors use all the in-
termediate states. The proposed approach would require managing
history, sets, models, and states, in latency-sensitive environments.
Jurgovsky et al. [15] employ LSTMs to do sequence classifica-
tion for fraud detection in e-commerce and face-to-face settings,
integrating also feature aggregation metrics, i.e., profiles. The au-
thors separate the data into two exclusive sets, one for each setting.
In our approach, to leverage the available information, we define
scorable and non-scorable instances in training: we use the first
for the forward (state update) and backward (parameter update)
passes and the latter only for the forward pass. Another crucial
difference is that they consider short and long sequences of 5 and
10 time-steps, respectively. We train with sequences of hundreds
of events following the unbounded production scenario. A curious
finding, in their experiments, is that the LSTMs benefit from feature
engineering.
Finally, none of the above works deal with the practical problem
of implementing their solutions in a production system.
3 FRAUD DETECTION SYSTEM
The proposed fraud detection system leverages RNNs, composing:
• offline components to do preprocessing of the data, model
training, and batch prediction, as well as;
• online components to generate predictions for a stream of in-
coming transactions under rigorous throughput and latency
constraints.
These two components support the model iteration cycle and
the deployment of trained models. First, the architecture and the
hyperparameters of the model are adjusted offline. Then, the model
is deployed in an environment that fits the production constraints
for real-time systems processing transactions. Importantly, since
financial transactions arrive in real-time systems in the form of
events, throughout this paper, we use both terms interchangeably.
2
3.1 Problem formulation
We cast the problem in a supervised learning setting. Each instance
is an event denoted by a vector x labeled as fraudulent, y = 1, or
legitimate, y = 0. More or less information can be added depending
on the use-case; however, in general, we assume x to contain:
• Nn numerical fields xni , i = 1 to Nn , containing at least the
amount involved in the transaction, but also possibly other
fields (e.g., the geo-location coordinates of the transaction
or the number of items purchased);
• Nc categorical fields xc j , j = 1 to Nc , usually strings, such
as the merchant category code (MCC), the merchant’s name,
country code, currency code, or input mode of the card data
(e.g., chip, magnetic stripe, manual input, web browser);
• Nt timestamp fields xtk , k = 1 to Nt , containing at least the
timestamp of the transaction but also possibly including the
expiry and issuing dates of the bank card;
• an entity identification field, usually a unique ID of the credit
or debit card involved in the transaction, xid .
The system produces a prediction yˆ ∈ [0, 1] for a subset of
instances, henceforth referred to as scorable instances, which are
determined according to some business logic. The system decides to
approve or block the transaction based on whether this prediction
is above a certain threshold, ythr .
3.2 Model architecture
The history of events of an entity conveys essential information for
classification. Similar events can have different risk levels for differ-
ent entities, depending on how they compare with the event history
of that entity. As an example, a transaction of $10,000 could be le-
gitimate if the non-fraudulent history of the user includes frequent
transactions of this amount. In contrast, it may be fraudulent if the
history of the user includes only low-amount transactions. The ar-
chitecture of the system reflects this by modeling the probability of
fraud for the ith event from entity k as conditioned on the current
and previous events by the same entity. Additionally, we assume
that a decision can depend on past events of an entity through a
fixed-size state vector s for that entity that encodes information
from past events as follows:
P
(
y(i,k )
)
= P
(
y(i,k ) | x (i,k ),x (i−1,k ), ...,x (1,k )
)
(1)
= P
(
y(i,k ) | x (i,k ), s(i,k )
)
. (2)
Importantly, the state associated with entity k after its ith event,
denoted above by s(i,k ), is assumed to depend only on the state
before the event and the data contained in the event. Thus, we
adopt the following recursive update of the state s(i,k ) to compute
the model prediction, yˆ(i,k ):
x ′(i,k ) = f
(
x (i,k )
)
(3)
s(i,k ) = д
(
s(i−1,k ),x ′(i,k )
)
(4)
yˆ(i,k ) = h
(
s(i,k ),x ′(i,k)
)
, (5)
where:
• f is a feature engineering and transformation block which
extends and converts the original input vector x into x ′, with
additional features and representing the information in a
dense space to feed typical neural networks layers (e.g., fully
connected layers or recurrence cells);
• д is a recurrent block which determines how to update the
state after an event;
• h is a classifier block which generates a prediction based on
the current event and state.
We assume that the three blocks contain learnable parameters,
which makes RNN models especially suitable for our problem.
Specifically, we use GRUs as our recurrent units, where each entity
is an independent sequence with its state, but sharing the learnable
parameters in f , д, and h across sequences. With GRUs as the recur-
rent block, the general process of updating a new state described
in equation 4, becomes:
r (i,k ) = σ
(
W (r )x ′(i,k ) +U (r )s(i−1,k ) + b(r )
)
(6)
z(i,k ) = σ
(
W (z)x ′(i,k ) +U (z)s(i−1,k ) + b(z)
)
(7)
s ′(i,k ) = tanh
(
Wx ′(i,k) + r (i,k ) ⊙Us(i−1,k ) + b
)
(8)
s(i,k ) = z(i,k ) ⊙ s(i−1,k ) +
(
1 − z(i,k )
)
⊙ s ′(i,k), (9)
where r (i,k) denotes the reset gate, z(i,k ) the update gate and equa-
tions 8 and 9 apply them respectively.U (r ),U (z),W ,U are learnable
weight matrices and b(r ), b(z), b are learnable bias vectors.
We tested various GRU-based model architectures on several
datasets. While different datasets and use-cases may require small
tweaks to the architecture, our general model structure is composed
of three blocks, denoted by equations 3-5.
3.2.1 Feature engineering and transformation block. The data trans-
formations, denoted by block f in equation 3, are depicted in Figure
2. The transformations in blue are not learnable, and as such, can
be precomputed before training in the offline scenario. These are
described in detail in section 3.3. By contrast, the transformation
in green is learnable and cannot be precomputed before training.
It consists of one embedding block per categorical feature which
maps integer indices to vectors in a dense space of predefined di-
mension. Due to memory constraints, we map only the k = 10000
most common values for each categorical to their embedding; we
map the remaining values to the same embedding.
The transformations are concatenated. The resulting feature
vector is passed through a fully connected layer to reduce its di-
mensionality before feeding it to the recurrent block.
3.2.2 Recurrent block. The recurrent block is responsible for learn-
ing the consumption patterns of the cardholders and embedding
this information in recurrent states. This block can be composed
of a single GRU or stacked GRUs, where the output of the first
becomes the input of the next. We tune the state sizes and number
of GRUs with a critical constraint in mind - the storage capacity of
your system. The larger the recurrent states, the larger the required
database and resulting resources. As we shall see in section 3.6, the
database has as many entries per card as the number of stacked
GRUs. As a result, we carefully tune the recurrent block to maximize
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Figure 2: Illustration of the entire model architecture
the fraud detection results while respecting the resource restric-
tions of the production system. As an example, in Figure 2, the
recurrent block is composed by two stacked GRUs.
3.2.3 Classifier block. We concatenate the output of the recurrent
block with the initial feature vector so that the current prediction,
yˆ(i,k ), depends on x (i,k ) directly and through the state s(i,k ). This
approach is not standard in RNNs, but it is comparable to a skip con-
nection, commonly used in Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs)
[23]. Hence, residual information that is useful for the current trans-
action, but not necessarily for future events, does not need to be
stored in the hidden state. The concatenated vector passes through
several fully connected layers. Eventually, it produces a final score.
3.3 Offline preprocessing
Training requires offline preprocessing steps that convert the data
to an adequate format and implement the subset of non-learnable
transformations in block f . To this end, we create new features
and transform existing ones into appropriate numerical formats
depending on their semantics, effectively transforming an original
feature vector x into a processed vector x ′1.
3.3.1 Numerical features. Transformations for numerical fields use
one of two possible strategies:
(1) Z-scoringwith outlier clipping for features with distributions
that are not very skewed and with which we expect the fraud
risk to vary smoothly, such as amount in US dollars:
x∗ni =
xi − µxi
σxni
(10)
x ′ni = max
(
min
(
x∗ni ,To
)
,−To
)
(11)
where µxi and σxi denote, respectively, the mean and stan-
dard deviation of the values of features xi in the training set,
1Most of these transformations were inspired by Google’s Data Preparation and Feature
Engineering in ML
and To is the number of standard deviations from the mean
above which to consider a value to be an outlier (usually
To = 3);
(2) Percentile bucketing for features with multimodal distribu-
tions, or with which we do not expect the fraud risk to vary
smoothly, such as latitude or longitude. Percentile bucketing
amounts to creating bins between every pair of consecutive
percentiles computed from the training set, and transforming
feature values to the index of the bin in which they land:
x ′ni =

0, if xi < P1xi
1, if P1xi ≤ xi < P2xi
...
99, if P99xi ≤ xi
100, if xi has a missing or invalid value
(12)
where Pkxi denotes the k
th percentile computed over the
values of feature xi in the training set. These transformed
features are interpreted later as categoricals.
3.3.2 Categorical features. We index each categorical feature by
mapping each possible value into an integer based on the number
of occurrences in the training set. For a given categorical feature,
xc j , the lth most frequent value is mapped to the integer x ′c j = l −1.
All values below a certain number of occurrences map to the same
integer lmax . Missing values are considered a possible value.
3.3.3 Timestamp features. The event timestamp feature is trans-
formed into the sine and cosine of its projection into daily, weekly,
and monthly seasonality circles, i.e., a timestamp xtk generates:
• hour-of-day features sin(hk ) and cos(hk ),
• day-of-week features sin(dwk ) and cos(dwk ),
• day-of-month features sin(dmk ) and cos(dmk ),
where:
• hk = hour_from_timestamp(xtk ) · 2π24 ;
• dwk = day_of_week_from_timestamp(xtk ) · 2π7 ;
• dmk = day_of_month_from_timestamp(xtk ) · 2π30 .
New features are also created by computing the difference be-
tween pairs of relevant timestamps, such as differences between:
• current timestamp minus card issue timestamp;
• current timestamp minus card expiry timestamp.
We transform all of the features through the z-scoring and outlier
clipping process previously described in section 3.3.1. We do not
consider yearly seasonality because the datasets used to train and
evaluate models usually span a maximum of one year.
3.3.4 Entity-based features. The entity identification field xid is
not mapped directly into a new feature. Instead, we group all trans-
actions by the entity, sort each group chronologically by transaction
timestamp, and then compute the difference to the immediately
preceding event within the same group. The value of this feature
for the ith event of entity k is:
x∗∆t
(i,k )
= x
(i,k )
t − x (i−1,k)t
where x (i,k )t denotes the timestamp of the ith event for entity k .
This feature x∗∆t is later treated as a numerical field and transformed
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into its final version x ′∆t through the z-scoring and outlier clipping
process described in section 3.3.1. This feature is especially impor-
tant because of the irregular time intervals between events. GRUs,
by default, assume a constant time interval between time-steps.
This irregularity conveys information that must be available to the
classifier since it can significantly impact the probability of an event
to be fraudulent. A representative example would be the case of
ten identical transactions made over ten days or over ten seconds –
the latter pattern is more likely to represent fraudulent behavior.
A corner case is the first transaction of an entity. For practicality,
the data collection process truncates all sequences at a given point
in time in the past. It is impossible to tell whether a transaction was
the first one for an entity or if it is the first in the dataset. Hence, we
impute the value of this feature for the first transaction in each se-
quence in the dataset with a manually-tuned value, usually slightly
higher than the average time between consecutive transactions for
the same entity (e.g., 30 days).
3.3.5 Sequencing transactions. Besides transforming the original
feature vector x into x ′, we also need to transform the dataset from
a format where each row is an event and the order of the rows is
random, into a format where: i) each row is a sequence of events,
separated with a specific character; ii) within each sequence, the
events are sorted chronologically; iii) supports quick random access
of sequences to efficiently build training batches.
Additionally, as it becomes clear in sections 3.4 and 3.5, the
training, and batch inference processes have different requirements
in the order in which the sequences should appear, so we generate
these data subsets separately in slightly different ways.
3.3.6 Implementation. The entire preprocessing pipeline is a se-
quence of Apache Spark jobs. These jobs take an entire dataset,
usually comprising a period of up to one year, and:
(1) create time features (section 3.3.3) and entity-related features
(section 3.3.4);
(2) fit and store the transformer objects for normalization, buck-
eting and indexing (as described in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.3)
based on the training period;
(3) load and apply all transformers to the training, validation
and test datasets;
(4) turn a list of events into a list of chronologically-sorted se-
quences of transactions using groupBy to group events by
the same entity and map(sort_by_event_timestamp) to
sort the events within each group chronologically;
(5) for each of the intended output subsets (training, validation,
evaluation), filter out the sequences that do not contain any
event in the period of interest;
(6) store subsets in databases for quick CPU access.
3.4 Training
In fraud detection, we can train and evaluate our models through
offline batch processing. However, strict business SLAs require that,
in production, transactions must be scored in real-time, changing
the paradigm into stream processing. There are implications when
using batch inference to obtain a realistic, unbiased estimate of
the model’s performance, as discussed in section 3.5. Furthermore,
given that we are working with time-series data, we must ensure
that the training procedure does not give an unrealistic advantage
to the model trained with historical data. More concretely, the
model must not be able to extract information in any way from
the future. Hence, our preprocessing stage ensures that each card’s
transactions are saved in the database by chronological order (and
fed to the model in that same order), and standard hyper-parameter
search techniques such as cross-validation are not employed. Below,
we shall discuss the details of our approach from the engineering
and machine learning perspectives.
3.4.1 Data engineering details. Given the size of the data we are
processing (each dataset occupies several TBs of disk space), I/O is
a bottleneck of our training. Hence, we made several optimizations
in order to: i) speed-up the access and storage of data; ii) efficiently
build training batches for the classification problem we are solving.
Firstly, we use the embedded key-value store LMDB [8, 24] for its
read performance to store the training, validation, and test datasets
(each subset as a separate database). Instead of building random
training batches of cards through several separate random reads,
for every batch, we access an index of the database at random and
read sequentially from there on batch size number of entries. This
way, we ensure that the model consistently sees different batches
during training in an efficient manner. We also employ a multi-
processing strategy where various CPU workers are continuously
and concurrently reading batches from the database and inserting
them in a queue to be later consumed by the GPU.
The last optimization is due to the extremely imbalanced problem
we are working with (cf. Table 1 for dataset characterization). We
want to enforce that, at every batch, the model sees some fraudulent
transactions. Otherwise, back-propagating the gradients derived
from a batch with no fraud would result in a model that simply
predicts all transactions to be non-fraudulent. As a result, we must
do aggressive fraud sampling, which, if implemented naively, is
an exceptionally inefficient process. Consequently, our tool builds
two distinct databases, one of the cards with no fraudulent trans-
actions, and another with cards containing at least one fraudulent
transaction. Since the fraudulent database is much smaller than
the non-fraudulent one, we can keep it in memory (RAM) hence
making the fraudulent reads, which occur for every batch, even
faster. For the validation dataset, we build a new database of a ran-
dom and representative sample of cards from the validation period
(typically a month) arranged in descending order in the number
of transactions. This allows us to quickly find the batch size that
maximizes the GPU’s usage, and there is no problem with having
the model evaluate the transactions always in the same order.
3.4.2 Machine learning details. In a production scenario, an RNN
continuously updates its recurrent state from the very first transac-
tion of a card until its most recent one. In the offline batch scenario,
forcing a model to classify the entire transactional history of a card
is undesirable for two reasons. Firstly, the transactional history
of some cards may be so long that it surpasses the GPU memory,
whereas others may have only a few associated transactions. This
disparity causes very irregular batches, and an inefficient usage of
the GPU memory. Secondly, domain knowledge dictates that one
does not need the entire history of a card to decide if the current
transaction is fraudulent. Because of this, we implement a cutoff on
the number of previous transactions of a card. This cutoff must be
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empirically set, depending on the dataset and use-case, to establish
a good compromise between GPU utilization and a sufficient history
for the model to distinguish between the user’s normal behavior
and a fraudulent one. Empirically, we found that in the payment
processor domain, a range from 100 to 400 previous transactions
seems to establish this compromise. Consequently, our batches have
a fixed size in the number of transactions resulting from the number
of cards (batch size) multiplied by the cutoff length. The motivation
behind using long sequences is to mimic, as much as possible, the
unbounded number of transactions, per card, in production.
Even though clients typically provide, in their historical data,
transactions from all of their channels and use-cases, in many cases,
they only want us to score transactions from a specific subgroup. As
an example, transactions can be either card-not-present (CNP) for
online transactions or card-present (CP) for transactions in physical
locations, and a client may ask us to build a model that has the sole
purpose of blocking CNP transactions. Although the model is only
scoring CNP transactions, it can still extract valuable information
from CP transactions. More concretely, imagine a sequence of suc-
cessive cash withdrawals followed by online purchases done in a
short period. The model would be further inclined to detect this sus-
picious behavior if it had seen the CP transactions before the CNP
ones. Hence, we embed this information directly into the training
procedure through the use of scorable and non-scorable instances.
A transaction that the model needs to learn how to classify goes
through the typical forward pass, followed by the backpropagation
of the respective gradients. For a non-scorable instance, however, a
forward pass is done, but the backward pass is not. As a result, with
the forward pass, the recurrent state of the card is updated with
new information. Still, the model does not learn how to classify the
non-scorable instances, focusing solely on the target use-cases.
We split the dataset into train, validation, and test subsets. Since
this is a binary classification problem, we use the binary cross-
entropy loss to train our models. Given the data’s size, an epoch is
not an entire pass through the data. Instead, an epoch is a random
sample, with replacement, of, approximately, 10% non-fraudulent
cards and all fraudulent cards in the training data.
3.5 Batch inference
Obtaining accurate, unbiased estimates of the performance of these
models requires us to compute predictions for all events in a full
period of data in the offline setting. It is similar to the validation
process executed periodically during training as described above,
with some crucial differences:
(1) truncating sequences to the lastm events is no longer feasible
as we want to generate predictions for all transactions in a
time window;
(2) ensuring sequence randomness is no longer needed, since
we evaluate all sequences.
Taking these two differences into account, we first filter out
sequences that do not contain any event in the time period. Then,
we sort the list of sequences by descending sequence length. This
allows each batch to be composed of similarly-sized sequences,
reducing the number of padded events. Finally, we adapt the batch
size as we go over the data; we start with a small batch of lengthy
sequences and progressively increase the batch size as the length
of the sequences decreases. Thus, the number of events in each
batch remains similar, keeping the GPU memory usage stable (and
high) over time. Figure 3 illustrates this process; in this example,
the batch size increases from one sequence to two sequences, but
the total number of events in each batch is the same, as desired.
3.6 Streaming inference
Feedzai’s main product, Pulse, is a streaming engine used to detect
fraud in real-time. Our product works directly in the hot path of
approving a financial transaction. As a consequence, we have very
tight latency SLAs (i.e., time to process one event). Depending on
the use-case and the client, our system may take at most 200ms
on the 99.999th percentile of the latencies distribution to process a
transaction. This time includes several components, not all directly
related with scoring a transaction, e.g., preprocessing and enriching
data, or applying actions according to predefined business rules.
For this reason, we need an extremely efficient streaming inference
process, where we adapt the way we provide the history of each
card to the model, described next.
3.6.1 Implementation Overview. Previously, in a batch inference
setting, sequences were explicitly ordered to maximize GPU usage,
andminimize inference time. In streaming, this is no longer possible,
since transactions have to be scored by the order in which they
arrive to the system. In this setting, the sequence information is
encoded in the recurrent states of the model and saved externally
into a key-value store. As illustrated in Figure 4, we store a state
for each card, and whenever a new transaction arrives we:
(1) Fetch the current state for the given card identifier;
(2) Feed the current transaction and the state we just fetched to
a GRU cell, yielding the new state for this card number and
the score for the respective transaction;
(3) Update the state in the key-value store for the given card.
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hClassifier
prediction: 
fraud score 0.6
new transaction:  card=B, amount=5, merchant=NiceCoffeePlace, …
GRU cellprevious state
updated state
Card State
A [0.4, 0.5, 0.2, 0.6]
B [0.5, 0.6, 0.3, 0.1]
[0.9, 0.2, 0.5, 0.7]
Figure 4: RNN State Update - Streaming
The state captures the history of transactions of a given card.
With this, we ensure that the time and space complexity of scoring
each transaction is constant, regardless of it being the first appear-
ance or the millionth one for that card. A new card without any
history has its state values all initialized to 0.0.
3.6.2 Storing and Accessing State. A key-value store stores the
state of each card seen by the system. Intuitively, the key-value
store grows linearly on the number of cards, as we have one entry
per card. Each entry size depends on the number of GRU layers and
the size of the GRUs’ states. Typically, we use relatively small GRUs
to minimize state size pressure. Besides, empirical experiments
have shown that recurrent states with more than 128 units do not
improve results and worsen training times.
The sheer number of distinct cards for most of our clients makes
it unfeasible to have all these states in memory. To circumvent this,
we use HaloDB [19], a high-performance, JVM-based, embedded
key-value store. HaloDB is empowered by LSM-trees [20] and an
efficient garbage collection process to keep write amplification low.
We use this embedded key-value store for various reasons:
• We avoid the network overhead of fetching this state from
an external machine.
• Reading a key is close-enough to RAM performance since
HaloDB keeps an index in memory for the keys stored.
• By design, LSM-trees frequently checkpoint their content
to disk (when flushing the memtable contents to immutable
sstable files [20]), making it easier to recover from failures.
Instead of an embedded key-value store, we could have chosen an
external database like Redis or Cassandra. Yet, this would make our
product more complex (with one extra component to operate), and
slower due to the cost of network I/O. One could argue that keeping
the state embedded can be a bottleneck to achieve the system’s
scalability and availability. However, Feedzai designed its product
to achieve this by partitioning the load into several processing
instances; and by having hot-standby replicas, respectively.
3.6.3 Additional Optimizations. To minimize latency further, es-
pecially on the high-percentiles, we avoid writing to HaloDB syn-
chronously (i.e., during the critical path of scoring a transaction).
To this end, we also use a small Least Recently Used (LRU) cache to
keep a copy of the most recent updated states in memory (RAM).
Hence, whenever we need to update the state of a given card, we
first write this state to the cache, and then asynchronously write
the same state to our key-value store persisted on disk. Whenever
a new transaction arrives, we first attempt to read it from the cache
and, if not present, read it from disk. Please note that this LRU
cache can be relatively small, as we only need to ensure that our
asynchronous write to the key-value store finishes before evicting
the item from the cache. From our benchmarks, a write on HaloDB
takes 0.1 ms on average (even on HDD), and around 400 ms on the
99.999%. Thus, we typically size the cache to hold some dozens of
seconds of data to cope with hiccups on high throughput scenarios.
The overall architecture can be visualized in Figure 1.
3.6.4 Expiring States. Clearly, for some of our clients, we cannot
keep states for all cards seen, forever, even when only writing
this state to disk. To cope with this, we asynchronously expire old
entities of our key-value store, periodically. This expiration happens
whenever we reach some threshold in time or usage space.
4 EXPERIMENTS
To validate our approach, we ran experiments with proprietary
large-scale datasets. We focus on two main goals: i) beating a strong
baseline in terms of model performance and; ii) ensuring that the
solution is usable in a streaming production scenario, at significant
throughputs and under tight latency constraints.
4.1 Datasets
We use two datasets to run experiments. Both are real datasets
from two major European financial institutions, processing card-
present (CP) and card-not-present (CNP) transactions. Although
we cannot disclose these datasets due to privacy and contractual
reasons, Table 1 shows some relevant numbers to characterize them.
Dataset A B
Total number of transactions 1B 4B
Total number of cards (entities) involved 76M 65M
Average number of transactions per card 7 61
Ratio of fraudulent to legitimate transactions 1:200 1:7000
Number of raw categorical features 15 53
Number of raw numerical features 2 4
Number of raw time-related features 2 2
Time period (months) 7 10
Table 1: Characterization of datasets used.
4.2 Fraud detection results
4.2.1 Setup. We split both datasets into test (1 month), validation
(1 month), and training (remaining months) sets. The splits respect
the chronological order of our data. Hence, the training sets precede
the validation sets, and the validation precedes the test sets.
We evaluate our models on the business metrics decided by both
the individual clients and Feedzai. We trained 10 models for each
dataset. For dataset A, we found that two stacked GRUs, the first
with recurrent states of 128 units and the second with 64, obtained
the best results. In dataset B, the number of GRUs and state size
was almost irrelevant, and so we use just one GRU with a recurrent
state size of 64 units for engineering reasons.
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We found the sampling factor and history length parameters to
influence model’s performance the most. For both datasets, gener-
ating training batches with 95% of non-fraudulent cards and the
remaining 5% with cards that have at least one fraudulent transac-
tion seemed to work the best. Model weights were updated using
Adam optimizer with the default 0.001 learning rate. We used pa-
tience of 20 epochs for early stopping, and after 10 epochs without
improvement, we reduce the learning rate by a factor of 10.
For our baselines, we considered production-ready LightGBM
models, one per dataset, each using around 100 profiles on top of the
raw features. These models are the result of considerable domain
knowledge and expertise, making them solid baselines to compare
with our novel GRU-based approach, which uses only raw features.
4.2.2 Discussion. The results from Tables 2 and 3 show that our
GRU-based model without profiles outperformed the LightGBM
model with profiles in the majority of the metrics2. The only excep-
tion was in the false positive rate (FP-Rate) for dataset A (Table 2),
where it obtained around 0.25% points less. The RNN model, how-
ever, convincingly outperformed the baseline in terms of recall,
with 10% points more, and 1.6% more money recall ($Recall) for the
same dataset. We highlight that the small improvement in money
recall equates to almost 1 million more euros saved2, the value
obtained by subtracting the money true positive values (%TP). For
dataset B, the RNN beat the LightGBM baseline in every metric,
with almost 3% points more recall and 6% points more card recall.
The 2.7% points improvement on money recall equates to more
than 8 million euros in fraudulent money blocked2.
The most sensitive hyper-parameter was the historical sequence
length (which decides howmany past transactions themodel should
consider). For dataset A, a cutoff length greater than 150 previous
transactions did not yield improvements, whereas, for dataset B,
the best cutoff length was 400 transactions. The reason for this
discrepancy resides in each dataset use-case. Dataset A comprises
only CNP transactions, while dataset B has both CNP and CP trans-
actions. CNP transactions are riskier, as they do not require the
cardholders’ presence as in in CP transactions. CP transactions are
also more frequent, and thus, the model trained on dataset B needed
a higher number of past transactions to obtain the best results.
4.2.3 GRUs vs LSTMs. As an additional experiment, we measure
the training stability of our GRU-based approach and compare its
performance to LSTMs. We fixed a model architecture for both
datasets, and only vary the recurrent model, GRU or LSTM, within
our architecture’s recurrent block. We trained three models of each
architecture per dataset (A and B). For dataset A, GRUs obtained
0.23% points less recall, on average, than LSTMs, with a smaller
standard deviation of 0.32% points when compared to LSTMs with
0.71% points. Interestingly, on dataset B, GRUs got 1% point more
recall, on average, when compared to LSTMswith a similar standard
deviation (0.44% points GRU vs. 0.46% points LSTM).
In our experiments, and for the respective target metrics of each
dataset, LSTMs did not convincingly beat GRUs. Since LSTMs are
more complex and have additional learnable parameters, GRUs are
better to operate in production. Namely, as we manage only one
2Due to privacy reasons only relative values can be disclosed.
Model Recall FP-Rate $Recall $TP
RNN w/o profiles +9.7% +0.34% +1.54% ≈+1MAC
Table 2: Dataset A: Delta between RNN and LightGBM re-
sults, for 15% precision, as requested by the client.
Model Recall $Recall $TP Card recall
RNN w/o profiles +3.2% +2.4% ≈+8MAC +5.9%
Table 3: Dataset B: Delta between RNN and LightGBM re-
sults, for 5000 card alerts/day, as requested by the client.
recurrent state instead of two, our deployment is simplified without
compromising model performance.
4.3 Engineering performance results
4.3.1 Setup. Our experiments assess the efficiency of our system
concerning its latency. To score a transaction, we used TensorFlow
Serving (TFX) v.1.13.0 to host our model. TFX is deployed as a
Docker image, on the same machine as Pulse (Feedzai’s streaming
engine), to avoid any network communication overhead. We used a
machine with 32 Intel Xeon CPU E5-2680 v3 @ 2.50GHz and 50GB
of RAM. To optimize performance, we compiled the TFX Docker
Image to our machine architecture. We use standard CPUs since
GPUs are not particularly worthy in a streaming setting where we
need to score each instance individually. We used dataset A and a
model with two stacked GRUs with unit sizes of 128 and 64.
To measure the latency for each event, we used an external
injector, pushing events to Pulse at a constant rate of 500 events per
second. Note that, while 500 events might appear a low value for
some financial settings, it is also our usual threshold for partitioning
the load into several machines, which means that for scenarios
demanding, e.g., up to 4000 events per second, we use 8 servers
in parallel. To prove the system’s stability, we ran the experiment
for one whole day, measuring the time spent by the system from
different probes: i) the writing time to disk, done asynchronously;
ii) the reading time from the cache, or disk (if the element is not
present in the cache); and iii) the total time to make a prediction.
The latter measures the pipeline in its entirety, from the moment a
transaction arrives to the moment a score is output. The results are
shown in Table 4.
Probe (ms) mean 99% 99.9% 99.99% 99.999%
Write disk (async) 0.05 0.06 0.37 62.37 398.70
Read (cache or disk) 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.50 3.13
Total prediction time 4.06 10.47 42.82 75.90 126.66
Table 4: Engineering performance - 500 events/s for 1 day.
4.3.2 Discussion. As described in section 3.6, our models score
transactions in the hot path of mission-critical financial systems,
which are incredibly latency-sensitive. Depending on the use-case
and client, our system may take at most 200 ms on the 99.999th
percentile to fully process a transaction. Hence, we often engineer
our systems for high percentiles, at the expense of the average case.
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Table 4 shows that we can couple RNNs to Feedzai’s Streaming
Engine to make predictions in production while adhering to our
most common SLAs. Still, the standard Feedzai setup is faster, on
average, and in most percentiles, than our RNN setting. On average,
a typical Feedzai setup takes around 2 to 3 ms to process a transac-
tion. Most of Feedzai’s production settings use tree-based models
such as Random Forests or LightGBM, which are more straightfor-
ward and generally faster. However, on these setups, we also need
to compute profiles, and in some cases, fetch them from external
systems. The latter is, in fact, the primary source of our product’s
latency in high percentiles. As a result, we observed that RNNs
without profiles are faster than some of our usual setups for high
percentiles (>99.999%).
Note that using a cache to avoid synchronous writes to our
embedded key-value storage is paramount to our success. Without
it, we would worsen the results considerably in high percentiles,
and breach our target SLAs. We used Yahoo’s HaloDB key-value
store for the simplicity of its API, easy integration with the JVM
ecosystem, and its performance. Further internal tests have shown
that Facebook’s RocksDB [10] could be an even better choice, given
its proven stability and high adoption in other production systems.
We tried to optimize our model using Tensorflow’s performance
best practices, including Pruning and Quantizating [11]. However,
these did not provide any relevant latency improvements for our
models and setup. Surprisingly, compiling Tensorflow to the right
CPU architecture gave us a 5x reduction in inference latency.
5 CONCLUSIONS
We present an RNN framework for detecting financial fraud in
real-time, describing all of its stages from preprocessing, model
architecture, offline training, to production. The cyclic nature of
RNNs allows us to efficiently capture patterns on sequences of
events, without the need to use intermediate feature engineering
(profiles). Unlike most DL setups in structured data, our RNNmodel
outperforms our best tree-based learners in the various metrics
evaluated. In addition, it does so while complying to millisecond-
level latencies. Key to our success, is the way we treat sequences
and the whole architecture of our system. To support predictions in
streaming, where transactions arrive with an unexpected order, we
treat sequences as interleaved sub-sequences with irregular time
between transactions. We also assume the history of transactions
to be unbounded, but compressed as a GRU state of fixed size.
Since we do not need profiles, this setup has several advantages.
From an ML perspective, we avoid the expensive task of building
and iterating profiles. From an engineering perspective, we avoid
the costs and complex logic to compute, store, update and access
profiles, simplifying our deployments. Lastly, besides showing how
our RNN model can be used in mission-critical low-latency produc-
tion systems, we also provide valuable lessons on how to process
the data, implement an efficient training scheme, and design the
model’s architecture to support predictions in streaming.
As next steps, we still want to know how the inclusion of profiles
in our model can provide overall gains in performance, and what
type of profiles yield the most improvements. The latter is essential
to conclude what type of information RNNs can intrinsically encap-
sulate, and build impactful profile features. Finally, we also want
to change the GRU architecture to take the irregular spaced time
intervals between transactions into consideration. Hence, instead of
feeding it as a feature, hoping that the model can learn to interpret
it correctly, we would leverage this information and directly embed
it in the mechanism that updates the recurrent states.
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